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Abstract 
The Denial-of-service (DoS) attack is considered 
one of the largest threats to the availability of cloud-
computing services. Due to the unique architecture of 
cloud-computing systems, the methods for detecting 
and preventing DoS attacks are quite different from 
those used in traditional network systems. A main 
target for DoS attackers is the authentication 
protocol because it is considered a gateway to 
accessing a cloud’s resources. In this work, we 
propose a cloud-based authentication protocol—one 
that securely authenticates the cloud’s user and 
effectively prevents DoS attack on the cloud-
computing system—by involving the user in a high 
computation process. Then, we analyze the protocol 
via Syverson and Van Oorschot (SVO) logic to verify 
the authentication process of the protocol in a cloud-
computing system. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Cloud computing is the utilization of a 
combination of hardware and software to provide 
services to end users over a network (e.g. the 
Internet). It includes a set of virtual machines that 
simulate physical computers and provide services, 
such as operating systems and applications. However, 
configuring virtualization in a cloud-computing 
environment is critical. A cloud-computing structure 
relies on three service layers: Infrastructure as a 
Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and 
Software as a Service (SaaS) (Fig. 1). IaaS gives 
users access to physical resources, networks, 
bandwidth, and storage. PaaS builds on IaaS and 
gives end users access to the operating systems and 
platforms necessary to build and develop 
applications, such as databases. SaaS provides end 
users with access to software applications. 
 
 
Figure 1. Cloud-Computing Layers 
 
DoS attacks are major security risks in a cloud-
computing environment because resources are often 
shared by many users. A DoS attack targets resources 
or services in an attempt to render them unavailable 
by flooding system resources with heavy amounts of 
artificial traffic. The objective of DoS attacks is to 
consume resources—memory, CPU processing space, 
or network bandwidth—in order to make them 
inaccessible to end users by blocking network 
communication or denying access to services. 
Handling DoS attacks at all layers in cloud systems is 
a major challenge due to the difficulty of 
distinguishing an attacker’s requests from legitimate 
user requests. 
Detecting a DoS attack in its early stage, in the 
upper layer (SaaS), is an ideal approach to avoid the 
destruction caused by DoS attacks on other layers. 
However, all service requests for SaaS need to be 
authenticated in order to operate. Verifying users via 
an authentication protocol is an initial stage in 
accessing these systems. Consequently, the 
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authentication protocol is a main target of attackers 
implementing a DoS attack, and decreases the 
availability of cloud services. The use of existing 
strong authentication protocols from traditional 
network systems in cloud-based applications may 
lead to DoS attack vulnerability. This is because the 
initiation of a massive amount of authentication 
processes could exhaust the cloud’s resources, and 
make the cloud-based application unreachable.  
In this paper, we discuss the types of possible 
external DoS attacks in a cloud-computing 
environment. Then, we propose an authentication 
protocol against DoS attack, and present a formal 
analysis of the proposed protocol. Section 2 provides 
an overview of DoS attacks. Section 3 states the need 
for authentication protocols. Section 4 describes a 
proposed cloud-based authentication protocol against 
external DoS attacks. Section 5 analyzes the proposed 
protocol via Syverson and Van Oorschot (SVO) 
logic. Finally, Section 6 presents a brief summary of 
the paper. 
 
2. DoS Overview 
 
DoS attacks have become more sophisticated in 
recent years. Many websites and large companies are 
targeted by these types of attacks. The first DoS 
attack was reported in 1999 [1]. In 2000, large 
resource companies, including Yahoo, Amazon, 
CNN.com and eBay, were targeted by DoS attacks 
and their services were stopped for hours [2]. 
Register.com was targeted by a DoS in 2001; this was 
the first DoS attack to use DNS servers as reflectors 
[3]. In 2002, service disruption was reported at 9 of 
13 DNS root servers due to DNS backbone DoS 
attacks. This attack recurred in 2007 and disrupted 
two DNS root servers. In 2003, Microsoft was 
targeted by a DoS called Worm Blaster. One million 
computers were attacked by MyDoom in 2004. In 
2007, a DoS attack was carried out by thousands of 
computers, and targeted more than 10,000 online 
game servers. In 2008, a DoS attack targeted 
Wordpress.com and caused 15 minutes of denial [4]. 
In 2009, a cloud-computing provider named GoGrid 
was targeted by a large DoS attack, and 
approximately half of its thousands of customers 
were affected. In 2009, Register.com was affected 
again by a DoS attack. In the same year, some social 
networking sites, including Facebook and Twitter, 
were targeted by a DoS. Many websites were 
attacked by DoS in 2010, including the Australian 
Parliament House website, Optus, Web24, Vocus, 
and Burma’s main Internet provider. In 2011, Visa, 
MasterCard, PayPal, and PostFinance were targeted 
by a DoS that aimed to support the WikiLeaks 
founder [4]. In the same year, the site of the National 
Election Commission of South Korea was targeted by 
DoS attacks. Furthermore, thousands of infected 
computers participated in a DoS attack that targeted 
the Asian E-Commerce Company in 2011 [4]. In 
2012, the official website of the Office of the Vice 
President of Russia was unavailable for 15 hours due 
to a DoS attack [4]. In the same year, many South 
Korean and United States (US) websites were 
targeted by DoS. Godaddy.com websites reported 
service outages because of such an attack. In 2012, 
major US banks and financial institutions became the 
target of a DoS attack. DoS attacks are evolving 
rapidly and are targeting large companies, which 
cause huge financial losses to those companies and 
websites globally.  
DoS attacks affect all layers of the cloud system 
(IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS) and can occur internally or 
externally. An external cloud-based DoS attack starts 
from outside the cloud environment and targets 
cloud-based services. This type of attack affects the 
availability of services. The most affected layers in 
the cloud system by an external DoS attack are the 
SaaS and PaaS layers. 
The two categories of cloud-based DoS attacks 
are internal and external cloud-based DoS [5]. 
Descriptions of external cloud-based DoS attacks are 
presented in the following sections. 
 
2.1.  IP spoofing attack 
 
In the Internet Protocol (IP) spoofing attack, 
packet transmissions between the end user and the 
cloud server are intercepted and their headers 
modified such that the IP source field in the IP packet 
is forged by either a legitimate IP address, as shown 
in Fig. 2, or by an unreachable IP address. As a result, 
the server will either respond to the legitimate user 
machine, which affects the legitimate user machine, 
or the server will be unable to complete the 
transaction to the unreachable IP address, which 
affects the server resources. Tracing such an attack is 
difficult due to the fake IP address of the IP source 
field in the IP packet.  
 
Figure 2. IP spoofing attack 
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2.2.  SYN flooding attack 
 
A Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 
connection starts with a three-way handshake, as 
shown in Fig. 3(a). A typical three-way handshake 
between a legitimate user and the server begins by a 
connection request sent from the legitimate user to 
the server in the form of a synchronization (SYN) 
message. Then, the server acknowledges the SYN by 
sending back (SYN-ACK) a request to the legitimate 
user. Finally, the legitimate user sends an ACK 
request to the server to establish the connection. SYN 
flooding occurs when the attacker sends a huge 
number of packets to the server but does not complete 
the process of the three-way handshake. As a result, 
the server waits to complete the process for all of 
those packets, which makes the server unable to 
process legitimate requests, as shown in Fig. 3(b). 
Also, SYN flooding can be accomplished by sending 
packets with a spoofed IP address. A sniffing attack is 
also considered a type of SYN flooding attack. In a 
sniffing attack, the attacker sends a packet with the 
predicted sequence number of an active TCP 
connection with a spoofed IP address. Thus, the 
server is unable to reply to that request, and the 
resource performance of the cloud system is then 
affected.  
 
 
Figure 3. SYN flooding attack 
 
2.3.  Smurf attack 
 
In a smurf attack, the attacker sends a large 
number of Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) 
echo requests. These requests are spoofed such that 
their source IP address is the victim’s IP, and the IP 
destination address is the broadcast IP, as shown in 
Fig. 4. As a result, the victim will be flooded with 
broadcasted addresses. The worst case occurs when 
the number of hosts who reply to the ICMP echo 
requests is too large.  
 
 
Figure 4. Smurf attack 
 
2.4.  Ping of death attack 
 
In the ping of death attack, the attacker sends an 
IP packet with a size larger than the limit of the IP 
protocol (>65,535 bytes). Handling an oversized 
packet affects the victim’s machine within the cloud 
system as well as the resources of the cloud system.  
 
3. The Need for Authentication Protocols 
 
There are a number of authentication protocols 
that are strong enough to verify identities and protect 
traditional networked applications. However, these 
authentication protocols may introduce DoS risks 
when adopted in cloud-based applications. This is due 
to the utilization of a heavy verification process that 
may consume the cloud’s resources and disable the 
application service. The OAuth protocol [6] is 
currently a widely used authentication protocol that 
controls the access of third-party applications to an 
HTTP service. In OAuth, the resource owner can 
allow a third-party client to access its resources 
through the owner. However, any insecure 
implementation of OAuth protocol can lead to the 
possibility of a DoS attack.  
Many authentication protocols have been 
proposed for the SaaS layer, but they do not protect 
against DoS attacks Yassin et al. [7] proposed an 
authentication process that uses a one-time password 
International Journal for Information Security Research, Volume 3, Issue 1/2, pp. 400-407, March-June 2013. 
 
 
(OTP) with mutual authentication of the user and 
cloud server. Yassin’s authentication schemes 
defended against replay attacks, but not DoS attacks. 
Some cloud-based authentication protocols for DoS 
prevention have been proposed (e.g., Choudhury et 
al. [8], Hwang et al. [9], Jaidhar [10], and Tsaur et al. 
[11]), but they use a smart card reader for the 
authentication process. Furthermore, the Yassin et al. 
[12] scheme also recommend the use of an extra 
physical device such as a fingerprint scanner.  
On their own, the authentication protocols may 
lead to DoS attack vulnerability. Therefore, it is 
necessary and important to verify DoS resistance in 
every process of the authentication protocol. For 
instance, verifying a huge number of signed messages 
via the server consumes the resources of the server to 
a significant degree, particularly when the attacker 
sends a massive number of forged signed messages. 
On the other hand, sending a typical client credential 
with each request in the authentication protocol will 
force the server to verify these requests based on the 
stored information at the server. As a consequence, 
server resources will be exhausted when dealing with 
a large number of requests.  
In this work, we propose a cloud-based 
authentication protocol that is capable of defending 
against external DoS attackers. The proposed 
protocol protects from DoS attacks by increasing the 
efforts made by the requestor. This protocol is 
capable of distinguishing between a legitimate user’s 
requests and a DoS attacker’s requests. The proposed 
authentication protocol was designed to be 
completely aware of any risk of DoS attacks, and is 
described in the following section.  
4. A Proposed Authentication Protocol 
Against External DoS Attack 
 
Table (1) shows the notations that are used in the 
proposed authentication protocol. 
 
Table 1. Notations of the authentication protocol 
Notation Description 
Client The cloud client 
CServer The cloud server/service provider 
CID Cloud user (Client) ID
TKN Token; the key of the token is known only by CServer 
SK Session key 
RCServer The nonce that is generated by CServer 
T Time stamp 
PSK Pre-shared key 
MK Master key of CServer
 
The proposed authentication protocol, as shown in 
Fig. 5, starts when the client sends a request for a 
service with CID to CServer. CServer will reply 
directly to the client by sending puzzle elements to 
keep the client’s resources busier and increase the 
Figure 5. A proposed authentication protocol 
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participation cost of the client’s side. At this point, 
CServer will block any CID that has performed three 
consecutive requests within a low time threshold to 
prevent DoS attacks. However, if the attacker 
attempts to launch a DoS attack by sending requests 
with randomly generated CID, the resources of 
CServer will be less affected because it will simply 
reply to each request with puzzle elements, and it will 
not check for the client’s data on any related database 
system or on any stored information. As a result, 
CServer is not required to check each request’s 
information to make any decision about the request. 
Thereafter, CServer will ask the client for the puzzle 
solution. In addition, CServer will send a nonce 
RCServer, and request the token (TKN) from the client. The client should have the TKN from the time when 
the client registered to the cloud system. Moreover, 
the key of the TKN is known only by CServer. Once 
the client solves the puzzle, the client will send the 
TKN, puzzle solution, the received RCServer, CID, and the encrypted timestamp T by a pre-shared key (PSK) 
to CServer for validation. At this point, CServer will 
have all the information required to validate the 
authentication requests, so CServer can apply the 
validation process to only a few operations, such as 
the following: 
 CServer will check the solution of the puzzle 
problem to determine whether or not it is correct. 
 CServer will check the time difference between 
the received timestamp T and the current 
timestamp to determine whether or not it is a 
reasonable time difference in which to find the 
solution.  
If either of the two conditions does not apply, 
CServer will drop the request and consider it as an 
attacker’s request. If the client request passes the two 
conditions, CServer will decrypt the TKN and 
validate the decrypted information that contains the 
CID. After the validation process, CServer will 
generate the session key (SK), which is encrypted via 
a pre-shared key (PSK). Moreover, CServer will add 
both the SK and T information to the TKN. 
Consequently, CServer is not aware of possible DoS 
attacks on key storage. Furthermore, CServer can 
apply the refreshment property of the session key for 
future communication by adding the SK information 
to TKN. Then, CServer will send the generated SK 
that is encrypted by PSK, and the modified TKN to 
the client. Finally, the client will confirm the SK by 
sending back the received TKN, and the encrypted T 
by the SK. Then, CServer will decrypt the TKN, 
validate the CID and T, and then confirm the SK. 
Later, the two parties can agree upon the sub-session 
keys by re-applying the last two processes so that the 
CServer can generate a sub-session key and add it to 
the TKN without storing it in the cloud system. 
 
5. Formal Analysis of the Proposed 
Authentication Protocol via SVO Logic 
 
Burrows, Abadi and Needham (BAN) proposed a 
“belief logic” [13] to analyze the security 
requirements of the authentication protocols. 
Subsequently, SVO logic was introduced by 
Syverson et al. [14] as an extension model to cover 
some limitations of BAN. SVO uses some of its own 
notations in addition to those used in BAN. The 
analysis steps of any authentication protocol via SVO 
[15] are as follows: 
1) Initial assumption is an assumption of initial 
status of the protocol such as belief on freshness of 
nonces, and so on. 
2) Received message assumption is an assumption 
about messages each party receives in the case that a 
protocol completes faithfully. 
3) Comprehension assumption is an assumption 
about what is comprehended by the principal of each 
received message. 
4) Interpretation assumption is an assumption 
about the way each party interprets the received 
messages. 
5) Derivation derives the beliefs that each party 
obtains by the previous assumptions, and checks the 
authentication goals that are derived. 
 
Table (2) shows the notations that are used in 
SVO logic. 
 
Table 2. Notations of the SVO 
Notation Description 
P believes X P  can take X as true
P received X P has received a 
message containing X 
P said X P believes X when P
sent it 
P says X P has said X 
P has X X is initially available to
P, freshly generated by P, or 
received by P 
P controls X P has a jurisdiction on X
fresh(X) X is fresh, and it has not 
been sent before 
P
௞ርۛ ۛۛ ሮQ P and Q communicate with each other by a good 
shared key k 
PKψ(P, k) k is a public encryption key of P. Only P can read 
messages encrypted by k 
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PKσ(P, k) k is a public signature key of P. The key k verifies 
that the messages signed by 
the corresponding private 
key k-1 are from P 
PKδ(P, k) k is a public key-agreement key of P. A 
Diffie-Hellman key formed 
with k is shared with P 
{X}k X encrypted under key k
ہܺۂk X signed with key k
<X>*P The received message X is unrecognized by P 
 
The two inference rules of SVO are: 
Modus Ponens 
߮						߮	 → 	߰
߰ 	
Necessitation 
⊢ ߮	
⊢ ܲ	ܾ݈݁݅݁ݒ݁ݏ	߮		
 
Where Г ⊢ ߮ means that ߮ can be derived from the 
set of formulas Г. Using the above rules “⊢ ߮” means 
that ߮ is a theorem. 
The axioms of SVO are: 
 Belief Axioms 
A1. (P believes ߮  ^ P believes (߮	 → 	߰ )) 	→  P 
believes ߰ 
A2. P believes ߮	 → 	߮ 
A3. P believes ߮	 → ܲ	ܾ݈݁݅݁ݒ݁ݏ	ሺܲ	ܾ݈݁݅݁ݒ݁ݏ	߮ሻ 
A4. ൓(P believes	߮)	→ ܲ	ܾ݈݁݅݁ݒ݁ݏ	ሺ൓ܲ	ܾ݈݁݅݁ݒ݁ݏ	߮ሻ 
 
 Source Association Axioms 
A5. (P ௞↔ Q ^ R received {X from Q}k ሻ 	→ (Q said X ^ Q has X) 
A6. (PKσ (Q,k) ^ R received X ^ SV(X, k, Y))	→ Q said 
Y 
 
 Key Agreement Axioms 
A7. (PKδ (P, kP) ^ PKδ (Q, kQ)) → ܲ	 F0ሺkP,kQሻርۛ ۛۛ ሮ ܳ 
A8. ߮	 ≡ 	߮ [F0(k, kꞋ) / F0(kꞋ, k)] 
 
 Receiving Axioms 
A9. P received (X1, ... Xn) → P received Xi   for i = 1, ..., n 
A10. (P received {X}k+ ^  P has k¯ ) → P received X 
A11. (P received  ہܺۂk )   → P received X 
 
 Possession Axioms 
A12. P received X  → P has X 
A13. P has (X1, ... Xn) → P has Xi   for i = 1, ..., n 
A14. (P has X1 ^ . . .  ^ P has Xn) → P has F(X1, ... Xn) 
 
 Comprehension Axiom 
A15. P believes (P has F(X))	→ P believes (P has X) 
 
 Saying Axioms 
A16. P said (X1, ... Xn) → P said Xi  ^ P has Xi   for 
i=1,..., n 
A17. P says (X1, ..., Xn) → (P said (X1, ... Xn)   ^ P says 
Xi)  for i = 1, ..., n 
 
 Freshness Axioms 
A18.  fresh (Xi) → fresh (X1, ..., Xn) for i = 1, ..., n 
A19. fresh (X1, ..., Xn) → fresh F(X1, ..., Xn) 
 
 Jurisdiction and Nonce-Verification Axioms 
A20. (P controls φ  ^  P says φ) →	φ 
A21. (fresh (X) ^ P said X) →	P says X 
 
 Symmetric Goodness Axiom 
A22. P ௞↔Q ≡ Q ௞↔P 
 
In the proposed protocol, the initial three processes 
are computationally intensive, with exponential 
complexity (O2n), to ensure that the client expends 
some effort. The next two processes of the protocol 
authenticate the client, as shown in Fig. 6. 
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Figure 6. The authentication processes of the 
proposed protocol 
 
 
To formally analyze the authentication protocol 
via SVO, it is important to identify the goal of the 
analysis. In this protocol, the goal is the following: 
CServer authenticates the client, so that 
CServer believes (client says T) 
where PSK  is a pre-shared key, and  SK  is a session 
key.  
Now the protocol analysis will be presented in its 
five steps, including initial state assumption, received 
message assumption, interpretation assumption, and 
derivation. 
 
5.1. Initial state assumption 
 
Initial state assumption includes all initial status 
of the protocol. 
I1. client believes client							௉ௌ௄						ርۛ ۛۛ ۛۛ ሮ CServer 
I2. CServer believes client							௉ௌ௄						ርۛ ۛۛ ۛۛ ሮ CServer 
I3. client believes (CServer controls SK) 
I4. CServer believes fresh(SK) 
I5. client believes fresh(SK) 
 
5.2. Received message assumption 
 
Received message assumption step indicates what 
messages each party receives. 
R1. client received {SK} PSK 
R2. CServer received {T}SK 
 
5.3. Comprehension assumption 
 
This step states what receivers believes and 
indicates what parts of the received message are 
unknown.  
C1. client believes (client received {SK}PSK) 
C2. CServer believes (CServer received 
{T}<SK>*CServer) 
 
5.4. Interpretation assumption 
 
Interpretation assumption step shows what the 
sender meant by sending the message.  
P1. client believes (client received {SK}PSK	→ client 
received {SK ^ fresh(SK) }PSK) 
 
5.5. Derivation 
 
Derivation step derives the analysis goal by the 
previous assumptions. 
D1. client believes client received {SK ^ 
fresh(SK)}PSK 
By applying Modus Ponens, C1, P1 
D2. client believes (CServer said SK ^ CServer has 
SK) 
By applying Source Association (A5), D1, I1, I2, 
 and Belief Axiom 
D3.  client			ௌ௄			ርۛሮ	CServer 
By applying Receiving (A10), R1, D2, and Belief 
 Axiom 
D3 shows that client and CServer communicate with 
each other by a good shared key (SK). 
D4. CServer believes (Client said T ^ Client has T) 
By applying Source Association (A5), C2, D3, 
 and Belief Axiom 
D5. CServer believes (Client said T) 
By applying Saying (A16), D4, and Belief Axiom 
D6. CServer believes (Client says T) 
By applying Jurisdiction (A21), I5, D5 and Belief 
 Axiom. 
D6 shows that our analysis goal, which aimed to 
prove CServer authenticates the client, has been 
achieved by applying the rules of SVO logic. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
DoS attack is currently a major threat and 
detriment to the availability of cloud services. With 
each developed defense mechanism against DoS 
attack, an improved attack appears. Using defense 
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mechanisms with existing authentication protocols to 
prevent DoS attacks in cloud-computing systems is 
not always effective. Therefore, this work proposed 
an authentication protocol to prevent external DoS 
attacks on cloud-computing systems. Moreover, the 
security effectiveness of the proposed authentication 
protocol via SVO logic was analyzed. This analysis 
proved that the proposed authentication protocol 
achieves the authentication requirements of an 
authentication protocol in cloud-computing systems.  
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